I Introduction
There is very rich and vast literature that studies behavioral responses to taxes using tax return data. As till recently such data was available only for the advanced economies, almost whole of such literature is set in the OECD countries, particularly in the US.
1 For at least three reasons it is important to extend this analysis to the developing economies. First, taxation structures of the developing countries are different in the sense that they have large informal sectors, weak enforcement and low third-party reporting. Investigation of responses in such settings is important to broaden our theoretical understanding of how these environmental factors affect behavior to taxation. Second, expansion of fiscal capacity of developing countries depends to a large extent on their ability to raise taxes efficiently. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests (which this paper will confirm) that still a significant proportion of government revenues are collected through very costly tax policies. More work on welfare and efficiency costs of alternative tax policies is needed before more expensive of such policies are phased out. Third, taxation bases of developing countries are extremely narrow as only a fraction of total population file tax returns and pay taxes.
2 To broaden theses bases and to spread the burden of taxation more equitably, policy makers need to encourage entry of new taxpayers. Despite importance of the issue, however, there is virtually no evidence on how responsive participation choices of taxpayers, particularly movements in and out of informality, are to the tax rates and other variables of the tax system.
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In this paper, I use an income tax reform introduced in Pakistan in 2009 4 as a natural policy experiment to estimate intensive and extensive responses to taxes. Before the reform, unincorporated businesses -sole proprietorships and partnerships, which comprise about 50% of all tax filers, were treated symmetrically for the purposes of personal income taxation in Pakistan. Their earnings were taxed through a graduated tax schedule comprising fourteen brackets with tax rates varying progressively from 0% to 25 %. In 2009, symmetric taxation within the self-employed sector was abolished, and a flat rate tax scheme, involving a tax rate of 25% with no exemption threshold, was introduced for partnership earnings. Tax rates on other forms of self-employment income were maintained for the year 2009 and were generally reduced for the year 2010 onwards.
For a number of reasons, the reform generates almost ideal conditions for studying the effects of taxation on participation, earnings, and business organization choices of individuals.
First, it creates tax rate variation between essentially very similar taxpayers, and thus enables construction of treatment and control groups which have similar initial earnings and tax rates but face drastically different taxation after the reform. Reported earnings trends are completely parallel for the two groups of taxpayers for pre-reform years and diverge sharply for the treatment group at the time of reform. Closeness of the two groups is further borne out by their identical bunching responses to the notches -cutoffs where average tax rate changes discontinuously -in the pre-reform tax schedule. 5 Second, as assignment to higher tax rates is based on business form and is not correlated with reported earnings, identification will not be confounded by issuescreated specifically by income-based control groups -such as mean reversion and secular changes in income distribution, which dogged similar studies in other settings. 6 Third, variation in rates created by the reform is large, particularly at the bottom of the earnings distribution where some of the taxpayers experience a tax rate hike of more than 50 times. Past work has shown that responses produced by small tax rate changes are severely muted, as utility gains from reoptimizing are not large enough to overcome frictions such as adjustment cost, inattention, or misperception (Chetty et al. 2009 , Chetty et al. 2011 , Chetty 2012 . Structural parameters estimated from such attenuated responses can seriously underestimate long-run costs of taxation unless the frictions are explicitly taken into account. Pakistani tax reform, however, is expected to produce responses free of attenuating frictions because of the strong and salient incentives it creates for such responses. And finally, for the study I have gained access to administrative tax records for the universe of tax filers in Pakistan for the years 2006-10. Availability of rich tax return data for years before and after the reform not only facilitates validation of identification strategy, but also allows consideration of fiscal externalities. These externalities arise because price changes lead agents to change behavior not only in the tax base price changes have been applied to but also in other bases. Central attraction of the notion of elasticity of taxable income that it is a sufficient statistic for estimating welfare costs of taxation 7 is seriously diminished if such spillovers are important and are not considered explicitly. The tax return data allows taking into account of these externalities including income shifting from partnership tax base to tax-favored sole proprietorship tax base, switching of business organization from unincorporated partnership firms to incorporated firms, and spillover effects on VAT base.
Following are the main results of my analysis. I find substantial extensive response to tax rate increase on partnership income. By the second year after the reform, almost 57% of the partnership firms, which report positive taxable income before the reform, leave the formal sector. If increasing pre-reform trend is taken into consideration, decrease in number of such taxpayers amounts to 70%. This response is particularly stronger at the lower end of the income distribution, where firms experience the largest tax rate increases. For two reasons, such a large response is not entirely unexpected. First, optimization frictions play little part in participation decision of agents, because utility costs of ignoring tax changes are first-order on the extensive margin as compared to second-order costs on the intensive margin. For the firms which do not exit, I find evidence of strong intensive response. Compared to control group, reported earnings of treated taxpayers reduce substantially after the reform (intensive margin elasticity of more than 2). The response is cleanly identified, as both treatment and control group have identical pre-reform trends which separate exactly at the time of reform.
Taking advantage of the fact that the reform creates variation across most of the earnings distribution, I explore heterogeneity by income groups, and find that intensive elasticities are weakly declining with reported earnings.
Since partnership firms are pass-through entities, 9 their taxable income responses should be mirrored at the individual level. When a partnership firm leaves the formal sector, or reduces 7 Feldstein (1995 and 1999) . 8 As tax liability enters directly in the participation constraint of agents, failure to reoptimize on the extensive margin results in first-order utility losses. Compared to this, at the intensive margin reoptimization offers only the second-order advantage of being able to choose the right consumption bundle (Chetty 2012) .
9 Pass-through entity is a legal structure where earnings flow through to the owners/investors.
3 its earnings, partners also leave, reduce earnings, or switch business organization. Indeed, one advantage of Pakistani context is that it allows identification of responses at both firm and individual level. Individuals report different components of their earnings including share from partnership firms in their personal tax returns. This makes it possible to study changes in individual-level behavior not only for the treated base but for other bases as well. The reform does not increase tax rates on other forms of income, and, thus, creates incentives to shift earnings to these tax-favored bases. I find strong evidence that such income shifting takes place (a cross-price elasticity of -0.89). The income shifting alone, however, is not sufficient to explain the large response of partnership income at the firm level. I find broad income elasticity of 0.48 at the intensive margin and almost 1 at the extensive margin, which capture the significant net effects of the reform on the treated individuals.
Purpose of the 2009 reform was to promote corporatization of Pakistani economy. Before the reform, incorporated firms paid a tax of 35% or 25% depending upon the size and age of the firm. Partnership earnings, on the other hand, were taxed through a graduated tax schedule with tax rates varying progressively from 0% to 25%. It was perceived that this massive difference between personal and corporate income rates was distorting firms' choice of organizational form by operating as a penalty on incorporation. in the first year and by 60% in the second year after the reform. 10 On the intensive margin, I
find a taxable income elasticity of almost 1 for such firms. Together, this reflects the significant negative effects of the reform on VAT base. The responses of VAT-liable firms, however, are 10 Since partnership firms are only a small fraction of total VAT base, which also comprises sole proprietorships and corporate firms, overall impact of the 2009 reform on VAT base will not be that strong.
4
considerably smaller as compared to exempt firms. This highlights the importance of invoicecredit mechanism of VAT. Being part of a VAT chain reduces a firm's ability to manipulate its earnings and to exit the formal sector.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the context, develops conceptual framework and describes data, section III discusses empirical methodology and results, and section IV concludes.
II Context, Conceptual Framework, and Data
II.A Context
Focus of this paper is personal income taxation of unincorporated businesses -sole proprietorships and partnerships, which constitute more than 50% of the total personal income tax filers in Pakistan. Legally, sole proprietorships are considered indistinguishable from their owner, and individuals are required to account for earnings from such firms in their personal income tax returns. Partnerships, on the other hand, are deemed distinct persons 11 and are obliged to file separately as well. They are, however, pass-through entities in the sense that, unlike corporations, income is not taxed twice and the taxation they face flows through to the underlying owners. To see this, consider a partnership with taxable income Z and P number of partners such that Z = P p=1 z p , where z p is the share of partner p. This firm, for a tax system T (z), incurs a tax liability of τ (Z).Z, where τ (Z) ≡
∂T ∂Z
; the partners, however, face no further taxation on z p , as they pay a tax of τ (z).(z − z p ), where z is aggregate taxable income from all sources including partnership share. This Pakistani scheme of taxation of partnership income is slightly different from other countries -for example the US -where partnership firms are not considered separate legal entities. In such countries, partnership earnings are taxed at the individual level: partners pay a tax liability of τ (z).z p rather than τ (Z).z p . This distinction is important for the Pakistani context, because the tax schedule before the 2009 reform consists of large number of brackets with progressively increasing tax rates so that τ (Z) is greater than τ (z) for a vast majority of taxpayers. For such a tax system, the individuals reporting z p > 0 are generally paying higher tax on their aggregate earnings, revealing their preference for the 11 Pakistani law does not allow creation of limited liability partnerships. Separate legal personality is, hence, only for the tax purposes, as partners individually and severally remain responsible for all obligations of the firm.
partnership business form.
12 Figure I shows the tax changes made by the reform. Before 2009, partnership firms and all self-employed individuals face the same tax schedule illustrated by solid blue curve in the figure. It features 14 tax brackets with fixed average tax rate -varying from 0% at the bottom to 25% at the top -applied to each bracket. The reform replaces this scheme with dichotomous taxation of partnership and sole proprietorship earnings. For partnerships, a flat tax rate of 25% is implemented that features no exemption threshold (dashed red curve in Figure I ). In contrast to this, graduated tax scheme is maintained for other forms of self-employment earnings but in a considerably simplified form: number of brackets are reduced to 5 and bracket thresholds are moved in such a way that majority of taxpayers experience tax reduction (short-dashed gray curve in Figure I ). There are some differences in timing of applicability of these changes as well. The reform was introduced on 06-06-2010, but is applied retrospectively to partnerships with effect from 01-07-2009 13 and prospectively to proprietorships from 01-07-2010 onwards. As mentioned earlier, purpose of the reform was to promote corporatization of Pakistan's economy by eliminating preferential tax treatment of partnership earnings as compared to corporate firms, but it had the unintended consequence of creating massive distortions within the unincorporated sector.
II.B Conceptual Framework
When faced with taxation, individuals react in a number of ways: they may work less, work with reduced intensity, change their occupation, or invest more in tax avoidance/evasion activities.
Under certain conditions, all margins of behavioral response are a source of deadweight loss and must be taken into account to assess efficiency and welfare consequences of taxation. Recent tax responsiveness literature, accordingly, models an individual's decision problem broadly as a choice between consumption c and taxable income z. Individuals are assumed to maximize utility u(c, z) subject to a budget constraint c = z − T (z) = (1 − τ ).z + E, where T (.) is tax liability, τ ≡ T (.) is marginal tax rate, and E ≡ τ.z − T (z) is virtual income generated by T (.). Such maximization produces a taxable income supply function z = z(1 − τ, E), where optimal z depends on net-of-tax rate 1 − τ and virtual income E. Relying on weak separability between activities underlying taxable income z -hours, effort, training, sheltering etc. -and consumption c, Feldstein (1999) showed that all behavioral responses to taxes could be captured by responsiveness of z to the net-of-tax rate 1−τ . Since then, elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
has become the central focus of public finance literature.
To make the standard model compatible with the Pakistani context considered here, I extend it in two directions. First I allow for the possibility that earned income could be of multiple types and later on the analysis is extended to account for the extensive margin responses created by tax changes. To consider the first extension, assume that taxable income z can be of two types: income earned as a sole proprietor z s and income earned as a partner in a partnership firm z p .
Each individual now maximizes a utility function of the form u(c, z s , z p ) and faces a budget 
Since ETI literature has not been able to find any compelling evidence of significant income effects on reported earnings choices, 14 I assume away income effects so that optimal choice of z j depends only on the two net-of-tax prices.
In this framework, heterogeneous tastes and abilities of individuals over the two income types will be reflected in the earning decisions they make. Partnerships are formed mainly to take advantage of productivity gains arising from complementarity of skills between individual partners. Sole proprietorships, on the other hand, offer entrepreneurs more freedom and control over business decisions. Optimal earning choice z j , given by the condition u z j (.) = 1 − τ j , thus, captures an agent's skill in producing income of type j. Specifically, for individuals reporting z p > 0 it must be that disutility of producing z p on the margin is less than that for z s because, for the reasons mentioned earlier, (1 − τ p ) is generally less than (1 − τ s ). This has important consequences for the welfare analysis as changes in any of the two tax prices can potentially lead to shifting of earnings between the two income types. The fact that most of the taxpayers are paying strictly higher tax to report z p > 0 implies that such income shifting captured the cross-price shifting elasticity ε
reflects real welfare loss rather than just change in reporting behavior. Earnings supply functions z j (1 − τ s , 1 − τ p ) also feature own-price substitution effect as increase in τ j leads to decrease in z j with an elasticity ε
Generally, tax reforms are associated with discrete changes in tax liabilities and hence may trigger participation responses as well. Increased tax bills can push agents on the margin of participation either to drop out of labor force -real participation response -or to move into informal sector -informality response. To account for these extensive responses, I incorporate a discrete participation choice into the model without specifying if it is a real labor supply choice or an informality choice.
15 Utility maximization problem can now be decomposed into two stages. In the first stage, agents make optimal earning choices conditional on participation and in the second stage they decide whether to participate or not. Participation into formal sector, however, entails fixed utility gains q arising, for example, from warm glow, productivity gains from use of financial sector, or access to better production technology. An agent will participate into formal sector only if utility from participation u(z
there is a smooth distribution of q in the population, represented by the distribution function 
, where t ρ is the average tax rate on participation.
In this model, choices of z p by individuals will be reflected at the aggregate level in both the number of and the taxable earnings reported by the partnership firms. Behavioral responses to changes in partnership income taxation can thus be studied both by looking at the firm or the individual level outcomes. In succeeding empirical section of the paper, I first consider responses of the partnership firms and then of the individuals.
15 In developing economies boundaries between real non-participation and informal participation are blurred. In the absence of state-provided social security, out-of-work individuals have to fall back on private -family or community based -social networks for consumption. In return, individuals may be required to work in domestic production. As these choices are not observed, no distinction is made between the two at this stage. Later on, however, I characterize nature of extensive response on the basis of evidence on compliance of tax filing provisions. Second, Pakistani tax code has very elaborate provisions on return filing. In addition to all registered taxpayers, anyone who has filed and paid tax in any of the two preceding years is required to file tax return. 17 Non-filing entails penalty and estimated assessment on the basis of past reports. Obviously, enforcement of these provisions cannot be assumed to be perfect given that only about 1 million of the 3.1 million registered taxpayers file returns. Tax administration, however, takes the view that most of the non-compliance relates to taxpayers who should not be on tax register anymore. Due to retirement, emigration, closure of businesses, etc. taxable earnings of such taxpayers have fallen below the exemption threshold, but they have not been formally de-registered.
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II.C Data
18 Ever since the automation of tax records in 2006, it is not easy for recently active taxpayers to stop filing or report zero taxable earnings, as it will expose them to higher audit probability and consequent penalties. All this has important implications for characterizing extensive response to the reform. Whether such response is real or an informality response is not observed, but some proportion of the overall response will be real unless the audit process is completely ineffective.
III Empirical Analysis III.A Partnership Firms: Graphical Evidence
In this subsection, I present graphical evidence on overall response of partnership firms to the tax reform; subsequently, the response is decomposed to investigate intensive and extensive behavior separately. Panel A of Figure where the firms experience the largest tax increases. Although it is generally difficult to discern intensive response from taxable income histograms, the figure shows some clear signs of it: postreform densities are higher at lower levels of earnings (below Rs. 100,000) suggesting a leftwards shift of the post-reform earnings.
Naturally, it can be argued that the observed changes to the density distributions might have been caused by some non-tax shocks hitting the economy around the same time as the 2009 tax reform. Simplest way to rule out such a possibility is to look at similar distributions for group of tax filers not affected by the tax changes. As mentioned earlier, the reform creates a very natural control group -the self-employed individuals (sole proprietorships), for whom tax system stayed the same for the year 2009. Some of these individuals, however, are also partners in partnership firms and receive partnership income share z p . Following the reform, these individuals face an incentive to shift earnings from z p to tax-favored sole proprietorship income z s . To ensure that no one in the control group is affected by the treatment, I take out all individuals from the control group who report non-zero z p in any of the years. As such individuals constitute only about 4% of the sample, their exclusion does not alter the analysis. Figure III shows the year-wise empirical distributions of taxable income for the control group.
The two panels of the figure are exactly analogous to the corresponding panels of Figure The empirical density distributions provide suggestive evidence of significant behavioral response to the 2009 tax reform: both sets of taxpayers react sharply to the changes in their tax regime, precisely at the time these changes become applicable. The distributions, however, conflate both intensive and extensive margin behavior, which needs to be separated to identify the structural elasticities governing the responses.
III.B Partnership Firms: Intensive Response
To isolate the intensive response, I use the difference-in-difference (DiD) methodology and compare reported earnings of partnership firms to the control group mentioned above. 
Here T is an indicator for treatment, t is post-reform year, and ln(1−τ it ) is instrumented by the interaction term 1(i ∈ T ).1(t = t )
21 . For panel data, the regressions is run in changes rather than levels. The estimate of ε in (1) will consistently identify elasticity of taxable income if it can be shown that parallel trend assumption holds -absent the tax changes, reported earnings would have evolved identically for both the treatment and control groups.
In Figure IV , I plot time series of log-income for the treatment and control groups. Panels A-D show average log-income for the cross-section of taxpayers with earnings within the indicated range for each year t, while panels E and F illustrate average change in log-income between years t and t + 1 for unbalanced and balanced panel of taxpayers respectively. The six panels
of the figure clearly demonstrate that the identifying assumption is satisfied for all the samples Second, elasticities presented in Table I Kleven-Waseem (2012) , studying bunching responses of similar taxpayers, find that taxpayers who file for four consecutive years are more likely to bunch at tax notches and are less likely to make strictly dominated earnings choice. They attribute higher responsiveness among these taxpayers to their superior tax literacy.
24 They use bunching at notches in the 2006-09 income tax schedule to identify intensive margin elasticities of taxable income for self-employed individuals in Pakistan. Elasticities reported there are always less than 0.3.
25 In fact, Kopczuck and Slemrod (2002) have suggested that policy makers can optimally choose ETI by appropriately defining taxable bases.
expected. However, we must also take into account that firm-level taxable income response captures multiple individual-level responses. Apart from conventional channels like reduced real activity or increased sheltering, decline in reported earnings of partnership firms may also come from other margins. Some partners in treated firms may switch business form or move production into informal economy. These individual-level extensive responses will be reflected as taxable income response at the firm level. In section III.D of this paper, I decompose firm-level response into these underlying individual-level margins.
Finally, the results show weakly declining responsiveness along the income distribution.
This may reflect heterogeneity in sheltering opportunities or influence of optimizing frictions.
Earnings and size of firms are positively correlated. Past work has shown that large firms find it difficult to conceal their real earnings.
26 Also, tax rate increases decline in magnitude as we move along the earnings distribution. For some partners of high-profit firms, the tax rate increases may not be sufficient to overcome adjustment costs. Responses of such firm will be muted resulting in declining responses along the earnings distribution. These estimates are presented in Table II . Column (1) of the table shows income group, columns (2) and (3) Figure VI further indicates that identifying assumptions for DiD are satisfied, and that specification like (1) can be used to estimate own-price elasticity
III.C Partnership Firms: Extensive Response
and overall elasticity ε ≡
. There is, however, one difficulty with this. Partnership firms, in their tax returns, do not report share of profits repatriated to each partner. This makes it difficult to ascertain pre-reform marginal tax rate on partnership earnings reported at individual level.
29 In studies like this, such marginal tax rates are computed by simulating tax models, which calculate marginal tax on earnings z as τ =
T (z+∆z)−T (z) ∆z
, where ∆z is a small amount (for example Rs. 100). As partnership earnings in Pakistan are taxed at firm level, marginal tax rates on z p reported at individual level cannot be computed exactly unless a complete breakdown of z p by firms is available. 30 To get around this difficulty, I assume that all firms have two partners who divide the firm's earnings equally.
As it is a very conservative assumption, it very likely provides lower bounds on elasticities.
31
29 Post-reform rate is flat 25%. 30 Please note that linking firms to individuals alone is not sufficient for this exercise, as individuals can be partners in more than one firms. Earnings from different firms would have experienced different rates depending on the total earnings of each firm.
31 The validity of this assumption can be verified in a simple manner. Panel A of figure VI shows that z p reported at individual level drops by 0.24 log-points after the reform. Partnership firms in the same earnings range experience an average tax rate change of about 0.2 log-points. This roughly gives an elasticity of 1.2, which is not far off from the elasticity estimated under the assumption (point estimate 0.91).
These elasticities are shown in respective panels of figure VI. Partnership earnings elasticity (point estimate 0.91) though quite large is less than half of the corresponding firm-level elasticity (nearly 2.5). Apart from the fact that the individual-level elasticity is a lower bound, this elasticity is smaller also because firm-level intensive margin response corresponds to both intensive and extensive margin behavior at the individual level. Reduction in reported earnings of a partnership firm could be due also to some of the partners leaving the firm and the formal sector altogether. Such response is not captured in panel A of the figure or in the elasticity reported.
Cross-price elasticity of -0.89 (panel B) indicates that taxpayers consider z p and z s substitutes and shift earnings considerably when incentives to supply z p go down. Overall elasticity of 0.48, however, suggests that this process is not as frictionless as it seems, and increased taxation of partnership income lead to lower overall earnings of the treated individuals.
III.E Individuals: Extensive Response
As shown in Panel B of Figure 32 There are many possible explanations for relatively smaller extensive response of z p at individual level: (i) leaving firms may, on average, have less number of partners as compared to firms which do not leave; (ii) individuals may be partners in multiple firms, all of which do not leave (iii) it may be that some of the partners do not file personal returns even before the reform -it is especially conceivable for partners who earn all their income from partnership firms and have total earnings below the personal exemption threshold. As data does not allow linking firms to individuals, these alternative explanations cannot be assessed. 
III.F Switching to Corporate Business Form
Purpose of the 2009 reform was to promote corporatization of economy by bringing income taxation of partnerships at par with corporations. In this section, I investigate if the policy was able to achieve its objective. Theoretically, a firm's decision to incorporate is influenced by a variety of factors. Incorporation offers limited liability, 34 legal continuity and perpetual existence. Corporations, however, are costly to create and maintain. They need to keep audited 33 In this section, I consider switching to sole proprietorship tax base (z s ) only; switching to corporate base is analyzed in the next section.
34 As noted earlier, Pakistani law does not allow creation of limited liability partnerships, which are permitted in many other tax jurisdictions.
accounts, face higher regulations, and experience double taxation. While making organizational form choice, entrepreneurs trade-off these costs and benefits, and the degree to which tax differences influence this decision is not clear. Past empirical literature on the subject, mainly based in the US, has found small to moderate effects (Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1994, 1997; Goolsbee 1998 Goolsbee , 2004 The evidence, hence, suggests that the reform has little or no short-run effect on corporate form choice. The result, however, needs to be careful interpreted. Incorporation is a complex decision involving non-trivial adjustment costs. Existing non-corporate firms may not reoptimize
35 If a new corporation is created by incorporation of an existing partnership firm, it will also show up as a new registrant in this series as corporations are required to register separately.
36 Here only 2010 distribution is treated, because taxpayer learn tax rate changes on 14-06-2010.
on business organization margin immediately after the change of tax incentives, and may wait for periods when adjustment costs of doing so are low. Appropriate time frame for evaluating such changes is, hence, medium to long term, when all firms are expected to have adjusted to the new incentives.
III.G Spillover Effects on VAT
More than three-quarters of the firms affected by the 2009 reform are required to charge VAT on their sales. 37 Changes in their behavior will have consequences for VAT as well. Specifically, the reform will influence VAT collections in two different ways. First, partnership firms which exit the formal sector will be lost to VAT as well. Second, firms which respond on intensive margin will pay lower VAT due to reduction in taxable base.
38
To investigate these spillover effects, I first look at the reported sales and costs of VAT-liable partnership firms. As VAT base, value added, is defined as sales minus costs, any response along these margins will capture direct effects of the reform on VAT. Panels A and B of Figure XI show respectively the pre and post-reform sales distributions of VAT-liable partnership firms.
The plots depict strong effects of the reform: compared to stable pre-reform trends, reported sales plummet after the reform. Reported costs of these firms, illustrated in Panels C and D, also show comparable effects. 39 In Panels E and F of the figure, I plot sales distributions for the control group, which comprises VAT-liable sole proprietorship firms. As can be seen, the 2009 distribution for the control group is very similar to the pre-reform distributions and exhibits no signs of break from the trend. Predictably, the 2010 distributions show the effects of tax changes that become operational for the control group in 2010. Cost distributions for the control group are similar to corresponding sales distributions but have been omitted for space considerations.
Together, the graphical evidence suggests significant erosion of VAT base: within two years of the reform, the number of VAT paying partnership firms drop by almost 65% as compared to 2008.
40
37 In Pakistan, manufacturing and retail firms with annual sales not exceeding PKR 5 million are exempt. All other firms are required to account for VAT.
38 Though it is possible that firms report different earnings/sales in their income tax and VAT returns, but it is not very likely. Since 2006 both income tax and VAT reports of firms are available to tax authorities in electronic format and it is very easy to reconcile the two. It will, hence, be extremely naive to report differently for the two taxes. 39 The numbers in panels A and B are different from those in panel C and D because not all firms report their sales and costs. Generally about 60% of the firms report their sales; firms reporting their costs are slightly less than that about 58%.
40 As partnership firms constitute only a small fraction (about 2%) of the total VAT base, which also includes
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To decompose the overall response into intensive and extensive margins and to see if the responses are different across VAT-liable and exempt firms, I redo the analysis of section III.B and III.C, but this time stratify the sample by VAT-liability. Table III reports Smaller intensive and extensive response for the VAT-liable firms is quite consistent with theoretical predictions. VAT paying firms are linked to their suppliers and buyers through the invoice-credit mechanism built into VAT. Being part of such a chain creates a paper trail and reduces a firm's ability to manipulate its reported earnings. Such firms may also find it difficult to leave the formal sector unless majority of their suppliers and buyers leave as well. Lower elasticities for VAT-liable firms, thus, confirm the importance of invoice-credit mechanism so vital for VAT.
The above analysis suggests that the reform casts significant negative effects on VAT base: a large number of VAT-paying partnership firms exit the formal sector and the rest report lower earnings. Some of such losses, however, will be recouped because of income shifting and business form switching. Section III.D and III.E illustrate that overall effects of the reform are not so enormous once such responses are taken into account. For the case of VAT, however, these mitigating influences will not be that great. Generally, proprietorships have lower annual turnover as can be seen from Figure XI . It is, thus, quite possible that the new or existing sole proprietorship firms to which earnings are shifted may be exempt from VAT because of sole proprietorships and companies, overall effects on VAT collections will not be that large.
having turnover below the exemption threshold. For such cases, income shifting will have no compensating effects.
IV Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the influence of personal income taxation on reporting behavior of taxpayers along both intensive and extensive margins in a developing country settings. The effects are studied using a tax reform which creates large tax rate variation between very similar taxpayers and thus generates laboratory like settings to identify the responses. I find substantial intensive and extensive responses to the reform, which consist of reduction in earnings, shifting of income across bases, switching of business organization and exit from the formal sector. I also provide evidence that the reform had negative spillover effects on VAT base.
These findings have three important lessons for tax policy in developing countries. First, larger elasticities at bottom of the earnings distribution, particularly the participation elasticities, imply that optimal tax systems must feature progressive taxation. With declining responsiveness along the income distribution, a flat rate structure is ruled out even if the government has no redistribution objective. Second, large tax rate changes are known to produce large behavioral responses; for developing countries where tax revenues are already low and tax bases relatively fragile, large tax rate changes need to be avoided to protect existing tax bases and to limit efficiency costs of raising taxes. Third, tax rate increases on a narrowly defined tax base produce large incentives and opportunities for income shifting. Most of the intended recipients of new taxation avoid taxes by switching business organization or shifting income across bases. Such reforms are less likely to produce additional revenues but impose significant welfare costs. Tax rate changes, hence, are needed to be as broad-based as possible.
FIGURE I The Tax Reform
Notes: the figure shows changes made by the 2009 reform in personal income tax regime of unincorporated businesses in Pakistan. Solid blue line plots the tax schedule applicable to all unincorporated firms and selfemployed individuals for the years 2006-08. It features fourteen brackets with fixed average tax rate -varying from 0 to 25% -applied to each bracket. This schedule is supplanted by two different tax systems in 2009. The dashed red curve shows the flat rate tax scheme -involving a tax rate of 25% with no exemption threshold -applicable to partnership firms with effect from 01-07-2009. The dashed grey curve depicts the tax schedule applicable to selfemployed individuals w.e.f. 01-07-2010. As compared to 2006-08 schedule, it has a higher exemption threshold (Rs. 300,000 as compared to Rs. 100,000) and lower number of brackets (six as compared to 14). All schedules show variations in average tax rates as a function of annual taxable income. Brackets' boundaries where tax rate changes are included in lower tax brackets. Taxable income is shown in thousands of Pakistani Rupees (PKR), and the PKR-USD exchange rate is about 97 as of December 2012. . Column (4) reports the coefficients on log net-of-tax rate in diff-in-diff regressions, where log net-of-tax rate has been instrumented in the first stage with a dummy for belonging to post-reform, treatment group. Columns (7) and (10) reports similar coefficients but regressions have been done in changes rather than levels. Sample for columns (5) to (7) includes all firms which report for two consecutive years t and t+1 and for columns (8) to (10) only the firms which report for all four years in the sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which are clustered at the level of individual taxpayers. All coefficients are significant at 1% level. (4) and (7) are based on simple regression of log difference in number of filers in each bin of the two distributions against log changes in net-of-tax rate experienced by the tax filers in that bin. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which are clustered at the level of individual taxpayers. Coefficients significant at 5% level are shown in bold. (0, 720, 000] . Column (4) and (7) reports the coefficients on log change in net-of-tax rate in diff-in-diff regressions, where log change in net-of-tax rate has been instrumented in the first stage with a dummy for belonging to post-reform treatment group. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which are clustered at the level of individual taxpayers. All coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
